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REVOLUTIONARY DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTS AND DISCUSSIONS

The aims of Revolutionary Development can be realized only by better coordination and very greatly improved military, police, administrative and social/economic/psychological efforts than is now the case in South Viet Nam. Success does not await merely the insertion of some new element - e.g., RD Cadre, or Free World Military Forces - into the campaign against Communist power in the South. Very bluntly: present VC control in the countryside will not be rolled back significantly or permanently by the GVN/RVNAF "system" as it now functions. That is true with or without improved RD Cadre.

The change in attitude and performance required - first, in the government, before changes can be expected in the people - are not merely ways of gaining success more quickly, cheaply or elegantly than otherwise; they mean the difference between potential success and almost certain failure. Yet the reforms required are unlikely to occur without strong, coordinated and focused exertion of US influence at high levels.

This paper presents first a recommended concept of the RD process-- definition, tasks, and strategy--~~and notes certain differences~~ *+ in some respects* from other proposed approaches. Next, it describes certain classes of shortcomings and limitations in GVN/RVNAF workings and instruments that tend to make both the earlier approaches and this new concept almost unrealizable at present, and indicates the type of measures and reforms needed. Specific, detailed recommendations and discussions of them follow in later tabs on the individual elements bearing upon RD.

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CONCEPT

Definition:

Revolutionary Development consists of those military and civil efforts designed to liberate the population of South Viet Nam from communist coercion; to restore public security and initiate economic development; to extend effective GVN authority throughout South Viet Nam; and to win the willing support of the people to these ends.

In any one contested area, the RD process begins when the GVN enters that area with the intent to stay, and to eliminate permanently any competing VC influence.

Tasks:

Following the destruction or neutralization of VC Main Force or NVA units threatening such an area, and the initiation of continuing military operations to prevent their return, four main tasks must be accomplished:

- a. Destroy or neutralize local VC guerrilla forces, and provide local security.
- b. Uncover and destroy the Communist Party apparatus in the area.
- c. Motivate the people to avoid collaboration with the VC and to cooperate with representatives of the GVN.
- d. Establish effective local government response both to the wishes of the people and to national authority.

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These tasks complement each other. Though they must be begun roughly in sequence--considerable progress in each earlier step is prerequisite to succeeding in or even starting subsequent ones--they overlap in time, and the later tasks are essential to carrying out the earlier ones thoroughly and permanently.

Thus: if VC guerrilla bands and "infrastructure" are ever to be ~~mapped~~ ^{destroyed} completely, and if they are to be kept from returning without the permanent commitment of large regular forces to the local area, full cooperation by the people with public officials is eventually a necessity. On the other hand, if the people in a contested area are even to begin cooperating actively with government representatives, the threat of VC retaliation must already have been reduced very markedly and for a prolonged period, by the operations of military forces against NVA/VC armed units and by police/intelligence work neutralizing the VC apparatus linking informers, Communist officials and guerrillas.

It is the bonds of mutual, reinforcing support between the Communist-led guerrillas and the Communist-run apparatus embedded among the people that give VC rule in the countryside its remarkable stability in the face of government challenges. The "popular support" that is so well-known as a requirement of guerrilla operations is enjoyed by the VC as a product not so much of ideology as of organization; and the organization that sustains the guerrillas is in turn shielded by them.

The VC guerrilla fish does not swim in an unstructured sea of friends, who support him, all, spontaneously out of sympathy for his cause. Support for the guerrillas - information, food, recruits, secrecy,

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shelter, guides, porters, money, and medicine - is organized by a hierarchical network of agents built up over years from local people of the area. This variegated "infrastructure" of VC cadre ranges from couriers, leaflet-passers and tax-collectors to district and province committee-members, battalion political officers and higher. It forms a quasi-governmental framework typically more stable in its membership, more complex, and more native to the area than the corresponding local GVN structure, and often more motivated and disciplined and more competent in its leadership.

So long as this apparatus functions, it assures the guerrillas of all inputs needed for survival and effectiveness, despite determined military efforts by GVN forces to find, fix and destroy them; and if local guerrilla bands are destroyed, new ones can grow from these roots. In turn, the threat of guerrilla terrorists protects the members of the apparatus, compels silence to government authorities on their identity and whereabouts, and enforces the rule of Communist officials. Apparatus and guerrillas must be attacked together; but by different methods.

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In contrast to conventional military operations against regular forces, an effective counter guerrilla campaign demands a complex civil-military coordinating military, intelligence, police, administrative, and social/economic/psychological/political components. Its aim has been described succinctly by Prime Minister Ky: "Our viewpoint is not only to root out the Viet Cong from the rural areas but to also root ourselves in the rural areas, and this not only for some time, but forever."

Strategy

The military aspect of the RD process in a selected area begins with appropriate "clearing" operations by ARVN, in some cases Free World military Assistance Forces, and provincial forces, designed to destroy, drive out, or disorganize all insurgent armed forces in the area and its vicinity, from NVA or VC Main Force regiments down to guerrilla squad: and to keep them out.

Whereas "sweep" or "search and destroy" operations --aimed at destroying such enemy units as may be encountered--in areas not yet selected for Revolutionary Development are short (from hours to a few days) and are not associated with any GVN intent to stay in the area or to provide permanent security, the "clear and hold" operations initiating RD must go on as long as necessary--whether days, weeks or months--to assure the elimination of all organized VC units from the area, and they must be followed by continuing operations both in the area, on the periphery and in adjacent regions to prevent any return. Although both situations call ideally for aggressive, mobile operations, the differences in intent should be reflected in differences in troop deployment, organization and tactics.

What is required for effective "clearing and holding" is saturation of the area with friendly forces for an extended period, with operations emphasizing aggressive small-unit patrolling, hamlet searches (with police), night operations, offensive ambushes, and quick reaction by

7

larger units to intelligence or contact. (As discussed below, so-called "clearing" operations conducted by RVNAF in recent years have almost never exhibited any one of these essential characteristics.) A particularly urgent need is for "offensive" patrols and ambushes--i. e., located where intelligence indicates that contact is probable--at night. Unless RVNAF night time operations begin at last to make it unsafe for the VC to move and enter hamlets at night, it is flatly impossible to sever their roots in the population and destroy the guerrilla bands or reduce VC control.

Both earlier and simultaneously in neighboring areas, FWMF/ARVN "search and destroy" operations must disrupt the ability of large VC units to interfere with the "clearing" and subsequent RD work. But ARVN battalions must, as well, be assigned to direct support of RD in the given area, both to achieve the required troop density and to deal with VC units in the vicinity too

8

strong for paramilitary units to handle. Even without the presence of VC mobile Main Force units or North Vietnamese forces, VC provincial guerrillas could often be present in multi-battalion strength: which makes it unrealistic, as in past concepts, to restrict ARVN responsibility in the clearing phase to the former elements, leaving the latter to RF. (As the increase in FWMF strength permits, some of these forces may also engage with GVN units in such "clearing" operation--with the primary objective of improving the performance of the associated GVN units--although the primary role of the FWMF would continue to be in the concurrent military offensive to defeat VC Main Force and North Vietnamese forces, rather than in direct support to RD.)

After the initial phase of saturating the area undergoing RD, much of the assigned ARVN effort would move to operations on the periphery and in adjacent areas, to prevent the return of sizeable VC units. Responsibility would stay indefinitely with ARVN for keeping out VC units larger than several platoons. But in addition, for most of the duration of the RD process, ARVN along with provincial forces must contribute to active security against platoons and smaller units as well: for such time until a combination of rural Constabulary and Police (supplemented, in some cases, with volunteer hamlet militia) can handle the job of local security, in an environment of reduced threat and increased public cooperation. (At the present time, only Police Field Forces are tasked and trained as rural constabulary. However, the need for better support and supervision for Regional and Popular Forces than seems attainable

while they are under JGS jurisdiction, and the need for local security forces acceptable in event of a ceasefire, both argue for shifting RF/PF away from the Ministry of Defense and labelling them Provincial/District Constabulary, under some other Ministry such as Revolutionary Development; in the short run they would retain their present military functions, though after retraining and strengthening they would evolve into true rural constabulary).

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Important Meanwhile, *F* from the very outset of these military RD activities and under their protection, a professional, highly coordinated intelligence effort must be launched against the VC cadre apparatus that commands and controls VC operations in the area. This effort is best directed by the Special Branch of the National Police, whose prime mission is investigation of crimes against the State, including subversion, terrorism and political conspiracy to overthrow the government.

✓ Special Branch Police, having entered with the troops, should proceed to gather and collate information on local VC informers, supporters and Communist officials, using information from all sources: in particular, from interrogation of defectors and prisoners, but also from agents, informers, hamlet search operations, documents, and increasingly from the operations of RD Cadre. With this intelligence, the Special Branch-- supported operationally by Constabulary (now, ~~the~~ (Police Field Forces and RF/PF), and RD Cadre--seeks to physically identify, arrest, interrogate, and win over and utilize, or prosecute and detain the VC Cadre remaining among the population: above all, the members of the Communist Party (People's Revolutionary Party). (Past concepts of RD have frequently assigned, vaguely and unrealistically, these police/intelligence functions involved in "identifying and eliminating infrastructure" to everyone but the Police: ARVN, RF, Pf, RD Cadre, or "the people themselves").

✓ This destruction of the leadership, key cadre and the support organization that sustains the guerrillas is crucial to the permanent disruption and elimination of VC political/guerrilla activity in the area. It is a slow process, not done once and for all, and in later stages the role of cooperation by the public becomes increasingly important (as in normal police operations).

With both VC informers and guerrilla "enforcers" temporarily inactivated by the military saturation of the area, and then increasingly eliminated by police processes, it becomes less risky for those already

hostile to the VC to reveal themselves to Government representatives.

With their information and help, the process can go faster and farther. Still broader cooperation among the people must await their confidence that the VC will not be coming back, again, as in the past. This takes time: time that must be filled by further evidences of the government intent to stay, its competence and ability to stay, its desires for contact with the people and concern for their welfare. Through the work and the conduct of soldier, police, RD Cadre and officials, the GVN must convey a radically new impression of itself in the rural areas, if the people are to come to believe that the risks of cooperation with it are, this time, genuinely and permanently low, and that what slight risks remain are worth taking. ^{Winning} ~~When~~ their support demands new attitudes, conduct and political awareness from all representatives of government and a new relationship between the Government of Vietnam and its people, a relationship of mutual confidence and understanding, communication, mutual responsibility and support. It demands local government that comes from, thinks like, and is responsive to the majority of the population. And it demands the promise, steadily being fulfilled, of a new and better society. These are highly challenging goals.

The "clearing" operations themselves, vigorously conducted and adequately prolonged, provide the first evidence ~~on~~ that the GVN means to remain, and to provide real security. As for the image of the GVN itself-its attitude toward the people, its worthiness of respect and

support - nothing that comes later will be more influential than the conduct toward the people of the only GVN representatives that many of them so far have ever seen: the military troops: By far the most important "civic action" these troops can perform, to influence attitudes favorably toward the GVN, is disciplined, proper friendly conduct in all their dealings with the people. (This calls for considerable evolution from current practices).

To go beyond these beginnings - to build positively on the predominantly military-intelligence-police work of the "clearing" stage, is the work of the "securing" stage, which aims at producing fundamental and lasting improvements in the security of the countryside and governmental authority over it. While regular and regional forces operate on the periphery of the zone and in neighboring areas to prevent VC units from returning, and small-unit operations continue within the area, the work of this period is ^{predominantly} ~~peripherally~~ ^{political} ~~political~~ non-military: police, psychological, economic, social.

There are three main tasks: First, to continue to discover and destroy the network of VC cadre, by police work with an increasing flow of information from the public. Second, to replace Communist or ineffective, corrupt or oppressive local authority with democratic and effective local government, responsive both to the wishes of the rural people and to national authority. Third, to motivate the people to cooperate with the GVN and to deny the VC their voluntary assistance: by giving them confidence that it is safe to do so, and

To carry out these tasks civil government must re-enter the newly-cleared ~~clear~~ area, beginning to end the VC-imposed isolation of the GVN from the hamlets in the area. It is for this role that the RD Cadre ~~from~~ are designed: to serve, under still-wartime conditions, as armed, effective civilian representatives of national government below district level.

The tasks of persuasion, demonstration, and organization required by the are not to be carried out effectively ~~by the~~ sort of "cadres" generally available in the past as rural representatives of the GVN: too often ~~lowly~~ lowly-paid, poorly trained, unmotivated functionaries from distant cities, uncoordinated, unsupervised and unarmed, afraid to stay in their assigned ~~work~~ hamlets overnight. In effect, these frail resources reflected peacetime notions of the task of carrying on the work of government in the countryside: not the difficulties and dangers of ~~constant~~ combatting a large armed political conspiracy.

Recent planning for pacification has concentrated most attention on the concept and development of a new breed of cadre: adequately trained and paid ~~trained~~, educated in the political aspects of their conduct and mission, coordinating essential specialities within a single team, armed for their own defense, working in their home districts and living in assigned hamlets day and night.

A standard Revolutionary Development Cadre Group - though numbers should be regarded as flexible, and to be tailored to local requirements - will consist of leadership and staff (7), a People's Action team (34), Census Grievance team (6), Civil Affairs team (6) and New Life

Development team (6). The group will be recruited from the district when it is to work, ~~trained~~^{trained} at a National Training Center in both common subjects (including weapons handling) and specialties, and returned to the command of their District Chief and Province Chief. It is essential that District and Province Chiefs and their RD control staffs fully understand the opportunities and responsibilities the cadre teams offer them, select their assigned hamlets carefully, and provide thorough supervision and support.

When security is adequate for a team - reinforced or fragmented as ~~appropriate~~^{appropriate} - to spend its nights as ~~will~~^{will} well as days in an assigned hamlet, ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ it moves in to stay until it is no longer needed. It provides from the beginning an armed government presence remaining in and around the hamlet capable of protecting themselves and helping to protect the people. All cadres will have been trained in the importance of their manner and attitude in winning the people's confidence, in the course of living with the villagers, working with them by day and talking to them at night.

The People's Action team contributes to security, helps the ~~people~~^{people} in their work, and eventually helps those who genuinely volunteer ~~xxxxxx~~ to organize a hamlet militia with a limited self-defense capacity.

The Census Grievance team, by individual private interviews (required of all individuals and family groups, thus reducing the ~~risk~~^{risk} of retaliation for informers), gather data for a census; ~~w~~ seek to discover in detail ~~the~~ in of National Police) the identify of ~~the~~ in conjunction with and/support

VC, VC-connected families and sympathizers; and above all, learn
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the ~~felt~~ needs and grievances of the people, on a ~~six~~ continuing
basis, passing these on to the District and Province Chiefs, to guide
the development work and improve local administration

All cadres will be given an understanding of government RD
policies and the political goals of the struggle, to be passed on to the
people (in particular, by the People's Action team). They are trained
to regard it as part of their function to eliminate the influence of two
types of enemies of the rural people: the underground Communists;
and the "rural overlords and bullies", corrupt, abusive and oppressive
hamlet/village administrative personnel and landlord elite. It is among
their missions to demonstrate the GVN's desire and ability to serve the
people and to provide initially a positive substitute for VC controls. To
this end, the Civil Affairs elements temporarily take over, if necessary,
the village/hamlet administration, or at least strengthen and improve
the existing governments. They ^{urge} ~~were~~ the people to organize into groups
with common needs - farmers, ~~men~~ housewives, veterans - to cooperate on
a regular basis. Eventually, and of crucial importance, the team assists
in organizing the election of a hamlet chief, administrative committees
and villages' councils.

Meanwhile, the New Life ~~Dev~~ Development team shows the people
the ways in which the government can respond to their felt social and
economic needs, providing materials for self-help projects, organizing
economic development projects such as road improvements and markets,
bringing in technicians, improved seed and fertilizers and assisting in

providing social services such as schools and clinics. The emphasis at this point is on meeting pressing needs, ~~arouse~~ arousing interest, hope and increasingly, confidence and participation.

From these activities, guided by the new, responsive local government, a network of leadership, responsibilities and shared actions should evolve to ~~the~~ tie the hamlet together, in ways that isolate the communists and make the people steadily less vulnerable to VC approaches. Likewise, the cadre are to establish continuing communication between the hamlet/village people and the provincial national government authorities. ~~And~~ And they are to guide the people toward a new rural life, one they will feel impelled to protect and improve by their own efforts, and by cooperating with the GVN and refusing collaboration to the VC.

The positive cooperation necessary to the GVN consists largely of volunteering information: on VC movements and activities, apparatus members, and VC overtures and threats (including those to which the village~~s~~ has yielded). It also means willingness to accept leadership posts ^{administrative} or ~~administrative~~ responsibilities in local government and self-help development projects. When villagers' attitudes make it possible, it can come to include certain self-defense functions, generally limited to warning or to repelling, with a few arms held in the hamlet, a handful of armed intruders; (the burden of maintaining local security would ~~be~~ generally still fall on government representatives such as Constabulary, backed by ARVN, Police and Cadre, ~~backed by ARVN~~, save for exceptional hamlets where local manpower was adequate and genuinely moved to train and arm for

a larger effort).

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An increasing withdrawal from voluntary collaboration [with the VC can be even more damaging to the guerrillas, and valuable to the GVN, than is the positive cooperation that villagers can offer the GVN. Much as the organized agencies of the government need assistance and volunteered information, it is the guerillas who depend on such public cooperation far more, for their very survival. Passive resistance to VC demands - "tax evasion", "draft dodging", malingering, slowdowns, denial increasing ~~denial~~/both of secrecy and information - will not, at this stage, kill off the VC by itself, but it will markedly lower their effectiveness and dynamism, their mobility and growth. And it will make them far more vulnerable to organized attack by the GVN.

An environment generally less sustaining to the VC - in which they can, perhaps, still get what they need, but only at the point of a gun - is an essential intermediate goal if the situation is to change from one in which most rural people will ~~take~~ take no risks either to help the GVN or resist the VC to one where most of them would take at least small risks to do each of these. That is a small change that makes a great difference. It will not come easily.

It will come only by a long process through which GVN and people together create a positive environment of security, good government, social justice, political development, and economic improvement such that the people will willingly cooperate with the government in protecting it against Communist incursions. In this environment, friendly to the GVN

and hostile to VC encroachment, the regular military/police/administrative agencies of the GVN can destroy or win over the remaining VC forces and apparatus and re-establish GVN authority permanently throughout South Viet Nam.

The RE Cadre themselves should stay in a hamlet "as long /as necessary" - a rigid timetable for progress from hamlet to hamlet would be inappropriate and, in fact, disastrous (though not, unfortunately, unlikely). They should remain at least until there is an elected local government working effectively, and it has a working relationship with the district government and technical cadre, and the RD Cadre presence is no longer needed for adequate local security: (given improvement in area security throughout the clearing and securing stages, adequate Province/District Constabulary (~~now RF/PFF and PFF~~) and National Police, tied in with hamlet militia (if any). The last of these criteria can, in some areas, mean an indefinite stay: easily /more than a year. others

In most ~~cases~~, a Cadre team might be expected to operate at most in one village of three or four hamlets in a year.

More and more /the Cadre role should ~~be~~ come to/ be supported and eventually, supplanted by the workings of the local government, on the one hand, and the regular officials and ministry representatives on the other. From /the beginning, District and Province Chiefs and their RD Control staffs should have been exercising close supervision of the ongoing Cadre effort, (with frequent personal visits), assuring adequate security, coordinating ~~and responding to the grievances and aspirations of the people~~

their activities with such agencies as National Police and Vietnam Information Service, and responding to the grievances and aspirations of the people /channelled upward by the Cadre. Increasingly, the Cadre should be joined in the hamlet by other field representatives of government, the more specialized "technical cadre" from such Ministries as Health, Agriculture, Education and Public Works, who alone can act to satisfy the longer-run hopes raised by the RD Cadre and the RD process. If these do not follow through with the assistance the national government is capable of providing, the RD Cadre message and example rebounds eventually against the GVN; if they do, the RD Cadre (and ultimately, /the RD Ministry) becomes unnecessary.

In the areas that have progressively been subject to successful Revolutionary Development, law and order will come to be maintained by the National Police, with a Constabulary arm evolving from /current provincial forces. In these areas the task of the GVN, at last having "rooted itself in the rural areas" passes from that of RD to "New Life Development"; a continuing process of democratic nation-building and economic development, in which social, economic and political activities ~~continue~~ continuously strengthen and improve the effectiveness of the local government, bring increasing social justice, and better the conditions of life.

Such achievements where security permits - and /this includes the cities - are instrumental to progress in the ~~non-secure~~ non-secure zones undergoing "clearing" or "securing", for they demonstrate visibly to people in those areas the benefits of living in a peaceful area under

the authority of the GVN; it is by GVN performance in secure areas that GVN promises in insecure areas will be judged. More importantly, of course, these benefits are ends in themselves. They are what the war is about.

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That is the concept and strategy. 1 Can it work, with present practices and instruments? What does it take to achieve it?

DISCUSSION

The RD Program will fail to extend GVN authority significantly or permanently in contested areas unless there is radical improvement in the operation, effectiveness and conduct of each of the major GVN/RVNAF elements bearing on RD. Some of the changes demanded are operational and organizational; others amount to such sweeping changes in personnel, practices and attitudes as to call for major reform within the Government of Viet Nam and its Armed Forces.

High hopes are now pinned on the RD Cadre, as the critical element of success in RD. This preoccupation suggests the view that past failures at "pacification" have resulted only from the lack of such cadre; or else that, whatever the failings of other RD elements, RD Cadre can compensate. Neither view is correct. This is not primarily a commentary on present performance of RD Cadre, though that leaves much to be desired; Cadre presently lack attention and guidance from district and province officials, and their training, motivation and internal leadership is insufficient to keep them working without supervision. Six months from now, improved instructors, better training, and orientation of district/province officials on the responsibilities and opportunities the cadre program offers them, should produce a cadre performance much closer to the conceptual level.

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Yet if there is no improvement over past and current performance of the other instruments essential to RD—military, police, officials and technical cadre—the introduction even of "ideal" Cadre alone cannot and will not bring success in any one of the RD tasks described above, and the RD process will fail.

This conclusion holds even though the aims of the various RD elements are described above in somewhat less ambitious terms than are frequently used.

The concept of RD above differs in several ways from most past or proposed approaches, notably in emphasizing: (1) the need for ARVN to support RD directly, (2) the primary role of the National Police Special Branch in destroying the VC cadre apparatus, (3) the need to motivate villagers simply to cooperate with the Government and stop collaborating with the VC, not necessarily to assume a major burden of their own defense. These changes are all in the direction of making the concept more realistic and attainable; and yet even the modified concept described cannot be said to be realizable with the GVN/RVNAF system as it is. To say why this is so is to point to the same weaknesses and problems of implementation that made necessary the above changes in emphasis.

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Broadly, what is required if even moderate success in RD is to be achieved is major improvement from current standards in:

Security

- (a) military support to RD, including "clearing" operations;
- (b) police/intelligence work against the Communist Party apparatus;
- (c) the attitudes and conduct of all government representatives, civil and military, toward the people.

These problem areas will be discussed in turn.

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Military Support to RD:

In almost no contested area designated for pacification in recent years have ARVN/RF forces actually "cleared" to a point where cadre teams, if available, could have stayed overnight in hamlets and survived, let alone accomplished their mission. In such circumstances--which persist today in most parts of the areas assigned "national priority" in I, II, and III Corps--lack of cadre has been no immediate problem, and provision of cadre is no solution.

There has been a strong tendency both to underestimate the level of security prerequisite to effective cadre operation, and to overestimate the degree of security provided by the type of military operations typically planned or carried out allegedly in support of RD.

Neither cadre nor police can live or operate effectively in hamlets where they are subject to attack by VC companies, or even to frequent harassment by platoons. Thus the usually stated goal of the clearing process--elimination of VC units "down to company size"--is unrealistically limited. Yet even this weak criterion has in no way been met; not only companies but VC provincial battalions (if not Main Force battalions and regiments) have continued to operate freely, especially at night, throughout zones selected for "clearing" in RD plans.

These plans have thus aborted at their very first stage, that of achieving minimally sufficient security for later operations; and the failure lies squarely within the sphere of responsibility of ARVN and RF forces. Nor is that failure to be made good by Free World Military Forces, in pursuit of their two main current tasks: protecting their immediate base areas of running short-term offensive operations against VC Main Force

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and NVA units. Quick sweeps by FWMF or ARVN through VC-controlled or contested areas, whether or not they find or chase off Main Force/NVA units, leave no "vacuum" awaiting the "in^sertion" of Cadre, PF's and Police. Within hours or days, the space behind that sweep is likely to be filled by VC provincial forces up to battalion strength; no room there yet for Cadre.

What is needed now for RD is not more "sweeps" and "search and destroy" missions, but appropriate and prolonged "clear and hold" operations. However, the past failure to enlarge the "cleared" area has had a number of roots, all of which persist:

a) Failure of ARVN division commanders to allocate a significant fraction of units or operational time even nominally to "clear and hold" operations in support of province pacification/RD programs.

b) Failure of such "clearing" operations as do occur (actually all better described as "search and destroy") to last long enough; several weeks at least, instead, typically, of hours or day or two.

c) Failure of AVNAF units, ARVN in particular, to employ any of the tactics essential to success in clearing small unit saturation patrolling, hamlet searches, quick reaction to contact, offensive night ambushes. All of these remain almost unknown in RVNAF, despite years of U.S. advisory pressure.

d.) Lack of RF companies sufficient in numbers or unit strengths to clear areas of of existing VC provincial guerrilla companies and battalions.

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e) Failure to combine and collate all available tactical intelligence, and above all to act on it, quickly or at all (some U.S. advisors conclude certain ARVN units use intelligence mainly to avoid contact).

f) Lack of aggressive leadership and command supervision at all levels; failure to seek contact or to pursue it other than by artillery and air; lack of discipline at all levels of command.

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If the "cleared" area is to be expanded, as a basis for progress in RD, it is clear that many more battalion-size units must be committed to appropriate, aggressive, clearing operations. It is also clear that any sizeable number of battalions must come, in the near term, from assigning ARVN units to this role; sufficient FWMF could not yet be diverted from operations against the Main Force NVA units, nor can RF grow to the dimensions of this task.

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If the RD ~~xxxx~~ process is to expand GVN authority significantly beyond the towns and bases now carried as "secured", ARVN must come to give the mission of supporting RD and protecting the population at least as high priority as offensive operations against Main Force units, and in recognition ARVN must commit many battalions to this mission for an indefinite period. To do so - even for the bulk of its combat battalions - is an appropriate adjustment to the growing presence of Free World Military Assistance Forces and to the needs and urgency of Revolutionary Development. Not to do so is, quite simply, to postpone expansion of GVN authority until it is done.

Timing

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Given this basic reorientation of ARVN missions towards much greater support of RD, certain command changes would be desirable. "Clearing" demands fullest exploitation of local military/police intelligence, and RD in general requires close coordination of local military and civil efforts; unity of command is highly important, and is best located at sector/province level. Thus, ARVN battalions devoted to this mission should be under sector command: along with all military and para-military forces operating for an indefinite period within the sector.

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Problems of ARVN aggressiveness, tactical operation, and leadership would remain, in principle; but experience with RF companies where there are enough for offensive operations and ARVN battalions assigned to sector control indicates that province chiefs are considerably more willing to use forces in small-unit operations exploiting local intelligence and contact than are division commanders.

The orientation and incentives of division/regimental commanders push them toward large (and futile) multi-battalion sweeps, toward the "big kill" that brings medals and promotions, and toward staying out of trouble and keeping casualties low in between the rare opportunities for big kills. The province chief has broad civil responsibilities that absolutely demand improved security; his career incentives urge him, given adequate forces, toward the type of effective operations on which he can expand governmental authority. Furthermore, US advisory influence tends to be more effective at sector level - except where sector is hamstrung by division or Corps - than at regiment, division or higher.

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It would be quite mistaken to picture this assignment of ARVN battalions to support of RF as giving them a role that is either "static" or "safe," or one that leaves a greater burden of the fighting and the casualties to the Free World Forces. On the contrary, this reallocation is realistically intended to multiply the number of contacts - in particular, offensive contacts - and VC casualties caused by these units.

Friendly casualties would probably also rise, particularly on the offense, though before long losses from VC ambushes and night attacks should drop. Overall, it would probably be less safe than at present to be an ARVN soldier: but safer for his family in the area.

Destroying Communist Controls:

No task is more critical to success in RD than destroying the Communist Party apparatus and its offshoots among the population; none is given so much lip-service; none is so totally neglected. Yet, even the most thorough military saturation of an area is only an interlude in Communist control, so long as its Party apparatus remains intact.

The first requirement for progress in this area is understanding and agreement, at high levels and throughout the system, as to the nature of the problem; next, a highly coordinated effort, with clear assignment of primary and supporting responsibilities. Neither of these is yet in sight. Vietnamese military authorities in RVNAF and the GVN are far from accepting the definition of the problem implied in the "Strategy" section above, emphasizing the Police/Special Branch/intelligence roles; yet they have not arrived at a clear or workable alternative.

Current JGS roles and missions statements (e.g. AB-140) assign the task of "destroying VC infrastructure" to military forces - indeed, to all elements of the ground forces, RF, PF and ARVN - not at all to National Police. Statements on RD Cadre roles stress the same task as a primary mission of Cadre and they go on to emphasize the contribution of "the people" themselves, catalyzed by the Cadre. This broadside assignment (managing to miss the most logical choice) indicates ignorance of the nature or importance of the task, and commanders in the field quickly reveal their own ignorance and uncertainty about this assigned mission; few of them will pretend to much accomplishment in it.

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CONFIDENTIAL

25

In particular, to ask province officials and military commanders (and their US advisors), "Just how does one 'destroy infrastructure'?" is to invite vagueness and silence. The word "arrest" is unlikely to be mentioned. More likely, after a pause, is "assassination", though even its advocates are hazy on the details of "who, how, on what evidence and on whose orders" this notion usually turns out to refer to night ambushes of village guerrillas or unidentified night wanderers - and they will admit it unlikely that the Communist Party has lost, or will lose, any significant fraction of its membership in this way.

More positive claims will be made about the contribution of such elements, especially RD Cadre, to "identifying" infrastructure: i.e., to picking up and passing on raw, unevaluated information bearing on the identity of VC "sympathizers" and local supporters. It is true that RD Cadre should be a valuable channel of reports on suspected VC Cadre, from their census and especially their Census Grievance operations and from their general contacts with the villagers. But useful as this is, how adequate is this source of raw data, and how is it to be used, and by whom?

Villagers - outsiders to the VC apparatus - may know the local VC tax-collector; but they can generally make little distinction, in reporting on "VC", between him and a District Committeeman, with whom, in fact, they would have little contact. Whereas the bulk of the VC, and even some of the lower-level cadre, are not Communist Party members, virtually all leadership positions, down to the smallest units and cells, are held by disciplined members of the Communist Party (People's Revolutionary Party

CONFIDENTIAL

26

in South Viet Nam). It is the Party members who form both skeleton and nervous system of the VC, and it is on this crucial leadership group that the intelligence and police effort must focus. Defection, arrest or death of these members of the VC "command and control system" offers maximum disruption of VC operations, and as defectors or cooperative prisoners they offer the maximum in exploitable intelligence.

If reporting is available to the RD Cadre is not simply to clog jails with masses of low-grade suspect, it must be collated with information from other sources: agents/informers, captured documents, and above all from the most productive source, the interrogation of VC "insiders", defectors or cooperative captives who were formerly members of the apparatus. RD Cadre have neither the access to such data nor the training to file, collate and evaluate it. Yet only by a coordination of all such intelligence by analysts with appropriate training can the critical Party leadership be identified, apprehended, properly interrogated and exploited: or targetted for efforts to win high-level defectors.

What is required here is a professional intelligence effort, and specifically "police-type" intelligence, i.e., aimed at compiling dossiers on the identities, whereabouts, organizational role and party history of individuals, rather than at unit order of battle.

Analyzing evidence on complicity, handling informants, arresting, interrogating, preparing cases for trial or disposition: These are police functions, best handled, so far as possible, by policemen. Under present security conditions, the police function of apprehension must in many cases be performed (or at least supported) by military detachments. But in targetting these operations, and in sifting through streams of un-

CONFIDENTIAL

27

armed "civilian" suspects, an understanding of evidence and of law is needed, as is action within a framework of law; it should be only the VC, not the GVN, that operates as disturbers of law and order.

The basic fact is that the Communist Party apparatus in South Viet Nam is not going to be destroyed by amateurs at the task; and that includes soldiers, S-2's focused on order of battle and tactical intelligence, RD Cadre "the people themselves" or vigilantes.

The Special Branch of the National Police, alone, was created for just such tasks as collecting and analyzing intelligence on, and acting to apprehend, individuals engaged in a political conspiracy against the State; and Special Branch Policemen remain the only element trained and organized for this task.

The Special Branch is, indeed, far from ready to carry out this mission adequately: not so much in terms of numbers of personnel as in their quality, training, education, experience and career motivation. Major attention and resources must be devoted to remedying its personnel weaknesses (including improving career incentives), improving training and procedures, and providing adequate facilities and support. But it already offers by far the most advanced and appropriate foundation on which to build. Recognizing the primacy of its responsibility for the destruction of the Communist Party apparatus and associated VC infrastructure is an essential first step.

Of equal importance is assuring the fullest coordination and the prompt, effective exploitation of military/police intelligence at all levels; neither exists today. At national level, the Special Branch

CONFIDENTIAL

28
should consolidate information from all agencies in a single, national file of intelligence on individual VC members and VC organization. In each province, there must be genuine consolidation of military/police intelligence files of all sorts, and combined interrogation facilities and operations centers, jointly manned by military, police and US advisors.

Such coordination of intelligence efforts is as badly needed - and as badly lacking - among US agencies and forces. It is imperative that a Director of Central Intelligence for Viet Nam be given the full responsibility and authority for coordinating and giving central direction to all US intelligence activities in Viet Nam.

CONFIDENTIAL

People, Cadre and Government

Discussions of Revolutionary Development commonly emphasize that the central object of the process is to win not only the sympathy but the active commitment and support of the people to the GVN side. This is seen as primarily the mission of the RD Cadre. But exactly what is desired of the people: how much and how urgently? And what can reasonably be expected of them: or of the cadre? Analyses of RD differ on the degree of public involvement that is regarded as necessary and attainable.

One influential view is that it is both feasible and essential to achieve a very high level of commitment to the GVN and total involvement in the defense against the VC, on a widespread basis, among villagers in areas currently contested or VC-controlled. This commitment would be embodied ultimately in a "people's self defense" or hamlet militia effort in which virtually everyone in the hamlet would participate vigorously--old women and children providing early warning, men and women building defenses and the younger men bearing arms--so as to ward off all but large-scale VC efforts to penetrate the hamlet for propaganda, tax-collection, recruiting or assassination. In its most ambitious form, this approach foresees a landscape of hedgehog defenses shutting out the VC, who wander rootless and harassed by a hostile partisan militia, unable to get a drink or the time of day, even at gunpoint. "The people" will provide their own security, better than the PF (or implicitly, RF or ARVN) provide it today; they will root out themselves the concealed VC agents in their midst, as the police have so far neglected to do; and all this is to be brought about predominantly by the catalytic influence of the RD Cadre. Thus default by the GVN military police on their responsibilities to protect the people and defeat conspiracy will be made good by an aroused citizenry shouldering

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the responsibilities themselves, a "countryside at arms."

We do not think this is going to happen.

It is too late in the war. These people have seen too many government promises broken, sooner or later, over the years: promises to remain, to protect them, to bring social justice and lasting benefits. Their resistance to active, visible involvement, now, reflects skepticism and fear that is rooted deep in bitter experience. They have seen Communist guerrilla presence outlast several pacification programs, many province chiefs and countless cadre. They are beyond the point where enthusiasm, major efforts, and truly deep commitment to a GVN are realistic mid-term demands. To ask of them at this point to take up a heavy burden of their own defense, to choose sides publicly and irrevocably, is to ask too much.

This is not to deny that hamlets and enclaves already exist where religious bonds and leadership or inspiring local officials have produced just the active self-defense that this concept demands. Cadre and officials should indeed be alert to support this spirit where it emerges spontaneously, or where it is a genuine response to GVN efforts. But it is not now something to be programmed and scheduled, or expected or aimed for on a mass basis.

31

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

In most of the area that requires RD, a genuine, intense, high-level of public involvement is simply not to be achieved in a matter of months or a year or two, if ever: not by the Cadre as they are, or as they may become, or even in context of all the reforms suggested in this paper. To press for it in every case, to take it as the basic measure of Cadre and RD success, is to invite distortion of effort, counter-productive nagging and coercion by Cadre, self-deception and false reporting. It is to ensure failure, of a sort that grows more costly for the GVN each year.

Fortunately, no such tour de force need really be demanded of the RD Cadre. What is attainable--through not easily, and still not by Cadre efforts alone--is low-to-moderate level public involvement on the GVN side: willing cooperation with government authorities, and increasing avoidance of collaboration with the VC. Under present circumstances, this is still an ambitious aim; and it is essential to thorough, lasting success in countering the guerrillas and Communist apparatus. On both counts, it would be an achievement worthy of the considerable efforts and reforms it demands.

Necessary cooperation with the GVN consists largely of volunteering information: on VC movements and activities, apparatus members, and VC overtures and threats (including those to which the village has yielded). It also means willingness to accept leadership posts or administrative responsibilities in local government and self-help development project. ("Self-defense" functions would generally

32

If the people in the contested areas are to cooperate with the GVN in this fashion, they must be persuaded that: (a) the risks of helping the GVN and of resisting the VC are very low; (b) the GVN means to win, and (with Free World help) has the ability to win; (c) the GVN deserves their respect and support.

For most people in the rural areas, these beliefs would represent radical changes in attitude. Their present non-involvement, passive help to both sides when pressed, or apathy toward the GVN and covert aid to the VC, flow from specific attitudes like the following, which must be countered:

- 1) The VC will win in the end: after the US leaves or stops fighting, when the whole effort against the VC will collapse.
- 2) The GVN will not stay in the local area, despite its promises; the VC will return (and its covert apparatus will remain throughout).
- 3) Any willing cooperation with the GVN will be noted by the local VC apparatus and eventually punished; participation as an elected or appointed GVN official is likely to mean death.
- 4) The RVNAF will not keep out the VC, will not support people's resistance against VC, and will not even reinforce friendly units under attack; RVNAF troops are a burden upon the people, rather than protectors of the people.
- 5) The GVN officials are indifferent to the welfare of the people.

CONFIDENTIAL

6) The GVN at low levels is the tool of the landlords and the local rich, ~~at~~ at all levels is a means to self-enrichment of officials.

7) The corruption, lack of motivation and inefficiency of GVN officials is in contract to the VC hierarchy, which is incorruptible, dedicated and efficient.

None of these attitudes can be changed by GVN/Cadre words alone. The supporting reality, the element of truth underlying each of these beliefs must change.

Words and actions of RD Cadre are scarcely the only evidence that shapes people's impressions of the nature of the GVN. When RD Cadre tell the villagers about the government, they are not speaking to the credulous or ignorant. They are speaking to people who see "the government" every day, people who are watching and experiencing the conduct of government representatives--ARVN, RF, PF, police district and province officials, technical cadre--even while the RD Cadre speak. If that conduct confirms what VC cadre say, rather than what RD Cadre say, the latter's words are wasted. That is now too often the case. The very conception of the RD Cadre as a tool to promote a favorable image of the GVN is prompted by the failure of the RVNAF and regular GVN officials to have done so by their normal behavior: indeed, from the tendency of many units and officials among them to blacken the name of the GVN.

The Cadre example at its best will have little lasting impact on the attitudes of the villagers so long as it must compete with the more vivid

CONFIDENTIAL

impressions formed by:

--RVNAF units that fail to provide security; to operate at night or interfere with the movement of armed VC; to support hamlets ^{or} to Cadre or outpost_s under attack at night; or even to protect themselves adequately against surprise.

--Rangers and other ARVN soldiers who steal chickens and pigs (and the leadership that lets them do it,) and fails to provide them adequate field rations); who eat and take goods without paying; ignore police and civil authority; commit petty crimes without punishment; and terrorize the towns with drunken rampages and undisciplined firing.

--PF or RF units whose leaders hire them out to collect rents for rich landlords.

--Village and district officials and police who set a price on every service they provide; who sell supplies provided for "self-help" projects; who not only provide for a decent living and their "old-age security," but manage to grow unjustly rich through corruption.

--ARVN artillery units that, with approval of province chiefs, contribute to insecurity and demonstrate indifference to welfare by erratic, unobserved, indiscriminate firing.

--Numerous officials and technical cadre totally lacking in competence, training, motivation or discipline.

--GVN neglect of the welfare even of its own representatives and its most committed supporters: e. g., the low pay, poor medical care and

CONFIDENTIAL

~~and~~ lack of dependents' housing and support for RF/PF.

Before a change can be expected in the people's attitude toward the government, there must be a change in the government's attitude toward the people. Whereas most discussions of RD emphasize the need for increased effort by the people, higher commitments by the people to the struggle and greater support for the government, what is truly needed, first, is increased effort by GVN and Armed Forces leaders, their own higher commitment to the struggle and to the ideals of government service, and greater support to the protection and welfare of the people.

In assuring vitally-needed collaboration by the public, VC presence and coercion is most effective in context of real GVN failings and abuses. Campaigns to end the collaboration cannot wholly succeed while the abuses continue. (At best, some good impressions will join the bad, so that feelings toward the GVN progress toward ambivalence.)

Of first important is improving the behavior of those government representatives whose misconduct the people see most widely and frequently and feel most acutely: the soldiers. The arrival of a Ranger battalion is generally regarded now by townspeople and peasants alike as the coming of a scourge. (One province chief recently threatened to resign if a certain battalion of Rangers, already en route by air to his province, were not ordered back.) In light of the combat results of most of these battalions in recent months, it is easy to believe that they have been worth far more to the VC than they have cost. But this is only an extreme; most other units abuse the public less flamboyantly but more steadily, and daily demonstrate in a multitude of ways their own feelings of resentment of their role and isolation from the public, lack of responsibility to the people or respect for them. No GVN program or "psywar" measure could have such widespread, immediate and favorable impact as change in such attitudes and conduct by the soldiers; without that change, other efforts to improve the image of the GVN and ^{induce} more willing cooperation ~~induce~~ cooperation have scant chance of success.

The first step must be to bring about understanding in the RVNAF, starting with the highest military commanders and working down to the junior officers and troops, of the importance of proper, disciplined conduct to Revolutionary Development and to winning the war. Effective "motivational training" aims first at just such understanding: plus understanding of the nature and aims of the war and the soldiers' role in it, to generate a sense of purpose, self-respect, and hope, prerequisites to self-disciplined behavior. All troops and officers in RVNAF need

that indoctrination: backed up increasingly by the example of dedication, purposefull direction and command discipline in their superiors. Second, the troops deserve more evidence of concern for their welfare by their government and country: above all, by pay protected from inflation and by adequate dependents' housing and other dependants' benefits (so that soldiers and their families will have less basis for resentful feelings that peasants, refugees and Chieu Hoi rallies should be doing "civic action" for them.)

These measures are just as relevant to the achievement of higher combat performance described earlier ^{and} as equally a necessity. Within this framework of better understanding and incentives, military discipline should begin to be rigidly enforced, to the ends both of adequate performance in field operations and of proper conduct toward the public.

Ideally, the military forces would act as "cadre for RD"--as VC forces do, in effect--serving as major instruments for orienting public attitudes, stimulating economic and political development, bringing hope for the future. This approach has been achieved elsewhere, ^{from equally} in a Free compromising beginnings, World counter-insurgency struggle: ~~from equally compromising beginnings~~ the Philippines after 1950. It would make the Army the engine of Revolutionary Development, exploiting the fact that it is already the largest organization in the countryside, with the farthest-flung presence and influence, its agents already trained and armed for their own defense and protection of others.

The recruiting, training, orienting and arming of civilian RD Cadre reflects, in past, pessimism about the likelihood of implementing the above approach successfully in South Viet Nam. Undoubtedly the challenge would be enormous, probably too great at this time. But at any rate, a lesser achievement within the Ministry of Defense, still a major challenge, is indispensable: to reform RVNAF at least to the degree that poor combat achievement will not preclude, and poor conduct toward the public not negate, all other efforts to support RD.

~~XXXXXXXX~~ Similarly on the civil side: the notion that the RD Cadre can function effectively without reform elsewhere is unsound.

For one thing, the Cadre need good government above them to carry out their mission. Cadre can testify to the intentions of the government to serve and protect the people; they can be a channel of grievances, aspirations and intelligence to higher authority. Yet if the government neglects to demonstrate those intentions in action--if the district and province officials and technical cadre fail to act upon the Cadre information, to resolve grievance, satisfy reasonable aspirations, exploit intelligence--the Cadre will have served little purpose. As representatives of the national government, RD Cadre are often correctly described as indispensable links between the district level, where national government has traditionally stopped, and the hamlets and villages. But bridging that gap is of conditiona value. Links to an indifferent, incompetent, corrupt government at district or province level are not worth very much to the villager.

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Moreover, the Cadre teams themselves need the supervision and guidance of alert, dedicated district and province officials if they are to do effective work. Experience has already shown that the selection, pay, training, motivation and internal leadership of current Cadre are not enough to keep them on the job, working hard and effectively, without supervision.

The attitude and concern of the district chief appears most critical to their performance. When the district chief is conscientious, sees the RD Cadre as "his" workers and understands their mission, they are making an encouraging start. Where the district chief is apathetic toward the cadre and accepts no responsibility for them--perhaps the majority of districts still--they fail to distinguish themselves in the public mind from the tradition of other "cadre" in recent years, i. e., they are prone to do almost nothing at all.

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Ultimately, it is a delusion to imagine that RD Cadre could persist as an honest, highly motivated element in what continued to be a corrupt, apathetic administrative system. Where the district/province officials are corrupt, the Cadre will be forced to buy their appointments and promotions (and draft deferment), and to kickback on their salary; immersed from the start in a traditional pattern of petty corruptions, they will scarcely be inspired to be avid reformers in the hamlets. In the end the GVN will get the cadre it deserves: just as it now has the RVNAF and police it has deserved.

But the same is true at the next /higher level of government, the district and on up the line. District and province /chiefs who buy their posts from Corps commanders and keep them with regular payoffs will not - cannot - refrain from the budget-cheating, payroll-padding, "business" operations and "taxing" of villages necessary to meet the payments. Nor can they easily be fired for incapacity, barring some provision to refund their "deposit". There is a deadly correlation between corruption at high levels in an administrative system and the spread throughout the system of incompetents and officials preoccupied with corrupt income. Corrupt higher-ups encourage and promote corrupt subordinates, and protect them from the consequences of poor performance of /duty or direct disobedience of orders. At the same time, such a system demoralizes and "selects out" the able and the dedicated who do not ^{play} ~~only~~ ~~xxxx~~ the game, and thwarts any attempts at reform initiated at intermediate levels. There is no escape from the requirement that reform, unlike revolution, must start at the top.

Radical reform, from the top, is urgently needed today within the Government of Viet Nam, including its Armed Forces: including in particular, throughout the GVN structure: (1) marked reduction of corruption; (2) encouragement of leadership and initiative; and (3) promotion on merit (for example, battlefield commissions). Such reforms must replace the current tendency to make appointments and promotions primarily on /the basis of diplomas, nepotism, political

alliance and kickbacks. The consequences of the present system - which deprive the GVN of the ability to execute its programs - are incompetence, lack of discipline, apathy and encouragement of further corruption. The military and administrative challenge posed by the Communist apparatus - which is, unfortunately, strikingly free of these particular weaknesses in its leadership - cannot be met by GVN suffering under these constraints.

Likewise, the known contrast to the Communists on this score is an intolerable handicap to the GVN in its psychological and political competition ~~condition~~ with the VC for public support and for the adherence of young, dedicated and able leadership.

The radical changes required within the GVN and RVNAF seem most unlikely to occur without the strong, focused and coordinated exertion of US influence at high levels. The goal of such US "intervention" must be a GVN capable of winning the support of its population and of winning the war.

An alternative short-run solution - to bypass GVN authority (e. g., by direct relations with province chiefs and RD Cadre, or to substitute US programs and execution, US security operations, for Vietnamese - would not succeed in the longer run. Unaccompanied by GVN reform, it would fail for many reasons, but one of the most fundamental is simply that the Vietnamese people do not expect the US to remain in Vietnam bearing such responsibilities indefinitely. Therefore, especially so long as large parts of the Communist Party apparatus remain intact, is to the political/military struggle between the GVN

and the VC that Vietnamese will look, for answers to the crucial question on which their commitment will turn: "Who will win, in the end?". By themselves, FWMAF military and administrative successes will appear irrelevant to this question.

So long as the GVN remains manifestly ~~i~~ unequal on its own to the challenge of the VC political and military leadership, deep pessimism about the ultimate outcome will preclude any widespread Vietnamese commitment, cooperation or involvement in the struggle on the side of the GVN.

Until the GVN and its Armed Forces begin to appear capable of countering a Communist resurgence after US involvement had lessened, FWMAF operations will appear to the Vietnamese (including the VC) as no more than a holding operations postponing GVN political defeat. That belief will block any significant progress beyond stalemate for the US and the GVN; and it will not change without change in the GVN and the RVNAF.

The war with the VC for authority and influence over the population of South Viet Nam can be won; but only by GVN officials who feel and act as servants of the people, and RVNAF soldiers who feel and act as protectors of the people. That means today, it is in their hearts and minds that "revolutionary development" must first take place.

End